CRIMINAL

PROCEDURE-SIXTH AMENDMENT-ATTORNEY'S
FAILURE TO COOPERATE WITH CRIMINAL DEFENDANT IN
PRESENTING PERJURED TESTIMONY DOES NOT VIOLATE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL-Nix v. White-

side, 106 S. Ct. 988 (1986).
The sixth amendment right to assistance of counsel' has
long been regarded as essential in protecting the fundamental
rights of those subjected to criminal prosecution.' In representing defendants, defense counsel serve as a legal advocate for the
accused as well as an officer of the court. 3 Due to the ethical
obligations of both roles, a conflict arises when an attorney discovers that the client insists on testifying4 and reveals an intent to
commit perjury.5 When faced with such a dilemma, the precise
duty of a defense attorney in rendering assistance has long been
an issue of controversy.6 Although it is universally agreed that an
I The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "[in all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2 See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). In Powell, Justice Sutherland
recognized that:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not
comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and
educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law.
If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for
himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the
rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial
without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or
evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both
the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though
he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every
step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty,
he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence.
Id. at 68-69.
3 See Callan and David, ProfessionalResponsibility and the Duty of Confidentiality: Disclosure of Client Misconduct in an Adversary System, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 332, 335 (1976).
4 Although the United States Supreme Court has never explicitly recognized a
criminal defendant's constitutional right to testify in his own defense, several circuits have concluded that this right has long been recognized. See, e.g.,
United
States v. Curtis, 742 F.2d 1070,1076 (7th Cir. 1984); United States v. Bifield, 702
F.2d 342,349 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 931 (1983).
5 See In re Malloy, 248 N.W.2d 43, 45 (N.D. 1976); see also Harris v. New York,
401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971) ("[e]very criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his
own defense, or to refuse to do so. But that privilege cannot be construed to include the right to commit perjury.") (citations omitted).
6 See Wolfram, Client Perjury, 50 S.CAL. L. REV. 809, 810-11 (1977) (hereinafter
Wolfram); Freedman, ProfessionalResponsibility of the CriminalDefense Lawyer: The Three
Hardest Questions, 64 MIcH. L. REV. 1469, 1477-80 (1966) (hereinafter Freedman).
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attorney should first attempt to dissuade perjurious testimony, 7
courts have varied as to what action should be taken when faced
with a client's insistence on presenting such testimony.' This issue was confronted by the United States Supreme Court in Nix v.
Whiteside.9 In an opinion by Chief Justice Burger,' ° the Court
held that a criminal defendant's sixth amendment right'to assistance of counsel is not violated when an attorney refuses to cooperate with his client's intention to present false testimony at
trial."
On February 8, 1977, in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, Emanuel
Charles Whiteside and two companions went to the apartment of
Calvin Love to purchase marijuana. 1 2 During negotiation of the
sale, an argument between Whiteside and Love ensued.'" Love
instructed his girlfriend to procure his "piece" and then returned
to his bed.' 4 Whiteside indicated that Love reached underneath
7 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 3.3. The comment to the
rule states:
When false evidence is offered by the client, however, a conflict may
arise between the lawyer's duty to keep the client's revelations confidential and the duty of candor to the court. Upon ascertaining that material
evidence is false, the lawyer should seek to persuade the client that the evidence
should not be offered....
Id. (emphasis added); see also Wolfram, supra note 6, at 846; Freedman, supra note 6,
at 1478.
8 Compare United States v. Curtis, 742 F.2d 1070, 1074-75 (7th Cir. 1984) (no
sixth amendment violation where attorney failed to present defendant as a witness
based upon belief that he would commit perjury) with United States ex rel. Wilcox v.
Johnson, 555 F.2d 115, 122 (3rd Cir. 1977) (sixth amendment violation where attorney, without factual basis, discloses client's intent to commit perjury).
9 106 S.Ct. 988 (1986).
10 Id. at 991-99. Although the Court's ruling was unanimous, Justice Brennan
filed a concurring opinion. See id. at 1000 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens, also filed a concurring
opinion. See id. at 1000-07 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Stevens also filed a
concurring opinion. See id. at 1007 (Stevens, J., concurring).
I' Id. at 991, 999. But cf. Lowrey v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1978) (Hufstedler, J., specially concurring). In Lowrey, Justice Hufstedler noted that:
[W]hen defense counsel moved to withdraw, he ceased to be an active
advocate of his client's interests. Despite counsel's ethical concerns,
his actions were so adverse to [the defendant's] interests as to deprive
her of effective assistance of counsel. No matter how commendable may
have been counsel's motives, his interest in saving himself from potential violation of the canons was adverse to his client, and the end product was his abandonment of a diligent defense.
Id. at 732 (Hufstedler, specially concurring).
12 Whiteside, 106 S.Ct. at 991.
13 Id.
14 Id.
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his pillow and began moving toward him. 5 Reacting to the
movement, Whiteside fatally wounded Love by stabbing him in
the chest.' 6 Although Whiteside claimed that he was acting in
self-defense, Whiteside was subsequently
charged with murder
7
and thereafter was appointed counsel.'
During the course of the investigation, Whiteside communicated to his attorney, Gary L. Robinson, that he stabbed Love
while the latter" 'was pulling a pistol from underneath the pillow
on the bed.' '"s Further questioning revealed, however, that
Whiteside did not actually see a gun, but only was convinced that
Love had one in his possession.' 9 Whiteside maintained this contention notwithstanding Robinson's advice that the presence of a
weapon was not essential in establishing a claim of self-defense
and that the reasonable belief that Love had a gun was
sufficient. 2 °
Approximately one week before trial, while preparing for direct examination, Whiteside revealed to Robinson 2' that he intended to testify as to having seen a "metallic" object in Love's
hand prior to the stabbing. 22 When Robinson inquired further,
Whiteside responded that he feared conviction if he did not testify as to having seen a gun.23 Whiteside insisted on so testifying
15 Id.

16 Id.

17 Id. Initially the Iowa District Court appointed Thomas M. Horan and
Timothy S. White to represent Whiteside. See Appendix to Petition for Writ of
Certiorari at A46, Nix v. Whiteside, 471 U.S. 1014 (1985) (hereinafter Cert. Appendix). Whiteside claimed, however, that he felt uncomfortable with attorneys who
were former prosecutors, Whiteside, 106 S.Ct. at 991, and requested that Thomas L.
Koehler replace them. Cert. Appendix at A46-47. This request as to Koehler was
denied since one of the associates in Koehler's firm had already began to represent
one of Whiteside's companions who was present at the stabbing. Id. at A46-48.
Thereafter, Gary L. Robinson was appointed and began an investigation. Whiteside,
106 S.Ct. at 991.
18 Whiteside, 106 S.Ct. at 991.
19 Id. Although he did not actually see a gun, Whiteside stated that, based upon
Love's reputation, he was convinced Love had a gun. Whiteside v. Scurr, 744 F.2d
1323, 1325 (8th Cir. 1984), rev'd sub nom. Nix v. Whiteside, 106 S. Ct. 988 (1986).
Whiteside's two associates, as well as Love's girlfriend, also denied seeing a gun,
but believed that Love probably had one in his possession. Id. A search of the
victim's apartment by both the police and Robinson shortly after the stabbing, however, did not reveal a gun. Id.
20 Whiteside, 106 S.Ct. at 991.
21 Upon being appointed as counsel for Whiteside, Gary L. Robinson requested
that Donna Paulsen be appointed to assist him. Cert. Appendix, supra note 17, at
A63.
22 See Whiteside, 106 S.Ct. at 991-92.
23 Id. at 991. When asked about having seen something "metallic," Whiteside
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despite Robinson's warning that such testimony would constitute
perjury and was not necessary to establish a claim of self-defense. 24 Furthermore, Robinson advised Whiteside that if he insisted on committing perjury, Robinson would not only seek to
withdraw as his attorney, but would also advise the court that the
testimony was perjurious and that he would testify against Whiteside.25 In response to this warning, Whiteside, while testifying in
his own defense, admitted that he did not see a gun in the hand
of the victim, Calvin Love. 2 6
At the close of all the evidence, a verdict of second-degree
murder was returned by the jury.2 7 Subsequently, Whiteside
filed a motion for a new trial maintaining general dissatisfaction
with the representation of his attorney. 28 Whiteside alleged that
he had been denied a fair trial by Robinson's insistence that he
29
not testify as to having seen a gun or "something metallic."1
Upon hearing the testimony of both Whiteside and Robinson,
the trial judge believed the facts as related by Robinson-that the
proposed testimony would have been perjurious.3 0 The motion
was denied.3 '
Thereafter, an undaunted Whiteside appealed to the Iowa
Supreme Court. 2 In upholding the conviction, the court reasoned that although a defendant is entitled to testify freely as to
all possible defenses, this right does not extend to the commisstated that " 'in Howard Cook's case there was a gun. If I don't say I saw a gun I'm
dead.'" Id.
24 Id. at 992. See also supra note 20 and accompanying text.
25 Whiteside, 106 S. Ct. at 992. According to Robinson's testimony, Robinson
told Whiteside:
we could not allow him to [testify falsely] because that would be perjury,
and as officers of the court we would be suborning perjury if we allowed
him to do it; ... I advised him that if he did do that it would be my duty
to advise the Court of what he was doing and that I felt he was committing perjury; also, that I probably would be allowed to attempt to impeach that particular testimony.
Id. (quoting Cert. Appendix, supra note 17, at A85.)
26 Id. at 992.
27 Id. As a result of his conviction, Whiteside was sentenced to a forty-year term
to be served in the state penitentiary. State v. Whiteside, 272 N.W.2d 468, 470
(Iowa 1978).
28 See Whiteside, 106 S. Ct. at 992. Although he claimed he was dissatisfied with
his attorney prior to pronouncement of his conviction, Whiteside advised the court
that he was satisfied with the representation of Robinson. See Cert. Appendix, supra
note 17, at A74.
29 Whiteside, 106 S.Ct. at 992.
30 Id.
3 Id.
32 See id.
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sion of perjury. 3 With regard to Robinson's admonitions to prevent such testimony, the court affirmed the holding of the trial
court.3 4 In particular, the court held that the duty of an3attorney
5
to his client does not extend to subornation of perjury.
Whiteside then petitioned the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Iowa for a writ of habeas corpus.3 6 In
the petition, Whiteside realleged that he was denied effective
assistance of counsel and denied his right to establish a defense
by Robinson's unwillingness to permit him to testify as he
The district court, in denying the writ, reaffirmed the
wished.
state trial court's finding that Whiteside's testimony would have
constituted perjury.3 8 The court concluded that since "there is
no constitutional right to present a perjured defense," Whiteside
39
was not entitled to habeas corpus relief.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit reversed and instructed that the writ of habeas
corpus be granted. 40 In rendering its decision, the Court of Appeals afforded deference to the findings of the state supreme
court and acknowledged that trial counsel reasonably believed
4
that Whiteside's intended testimony would have been false. '
Furthermore, the court noted that the right to testify on one's
33 Id.
34 Id.

35 Id. In commending the actions of Robinson and his associate Donna L. Paulsen, the court relied on DR 7-102(A)(4) of the Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers, which expressly prohibits an attorney from -[k]nowingly us[ing]
perjured testimony," and Iowa Code § 720.3 (1985), which makes the subornation
of perjury a criminal offense. Id.
36 Id. Whiteside brought the petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2254 (1976).
37 Whiteside, 106 S.Ct. at 992.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Whiteside v. Scurr, 744 F.2d 1323, 1325, 1331 (8th Cir. 1984), rev'd sub nom.

Nix v. Whiteside, 106 S. Ct. 988 (1986).
41 Id. at 1328. In making this determination, the court acknowledged that
whether counsel believed the defendant would testify falsely is a threshold question
that must be determined. Id. As noted by Judge McMillian, "'[w]here . .. the
veracity or falsity of the defendant's testimony is conjectural, the ethical dilemma
does not arise.' " Id. (citation omitted). For example, the fact that the attorney
suspects the contemplated testimony to be perjurious or the mere presence of inconsistent statements is insufficient to establish that the defendant will testify
falsely or has so testified. Id.; see also Butler v. United States, 414 A.2d 844, 850-51
(D.C. 1980) (inconsistent statements insufficient to establish veracity or falsity of
defendant's testimony); United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115, 122
(3d Cir. 1977) (in order to disclose client confidences, attorney must have a "firm
factual basis" that his client's testimony would be perjurious).
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behalf does not encompass the right to commit perjury. 42 Nevertheless, the court reasoned that even when the intent to commit
perjury is communicated to counsel, this does not alter the defendant's right to a fair trial or an attorney's duty to afford effective assistance of counsel. 43 Accordingly, the court held that
Robinson's threat to inform the court of the perjured testimony
constituted a breach of client confidence which amounted to a
deprivation of the defendant's right to effective assistance of
counsel. 4 4 Thereafter, a petition for rehearing en banc was de45
nied with four judges dissenting.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, 6 and
reversed the decision of the court of appeals. 47 The Court held
that Robinson's threat to inform the authorities of Whiteside's
contemplated perjury did not violate Whiteside's sixth amendment right to counsel.48
The sixth amendment right to counsel 49 was initially addressed by the United States Supreme Court in Powell v. Alabama.5° In Powell, several black men were indicted for a series of
rapes committed on two white women. 5 ' Subsequent to their arraignment, the defendants entered pleas of not guilty. 5 2 The trial

judge had "appointed all the members of the bar" for the purpose of representing the defendants at their arraignment.5 3 A
review of the record, however, revealed that no lawyer had been
named or designated to represent the defendants until the morn42

Whiteside, 744 F.2d at 1328 (citing Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225

(1971)).

See also supra note 5 and accompanying text.

43 Whiteside, 744 F.2d at 1328.
44 Id. The court held that counsel's threat to withdraw, to advise the state trial
judge, and to testify against Whiteside if he testified falsely, deprived the defendant
of due process and effective assistance of counsel. Id. The court noted that Robinson's actions fell short of effective assistance as they were contrary to his obligations of confidentiality and of presenting a diligent defense. Id. at 1329-30. See also
Lowery v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727,732 (9th Cir. 1978) (HufstedlerJ., specially
concurring).
45
46
47
48

Whiteside, 750 F.2d at 713.
Nix v. Whiteside, 471 U.S. 1014 (1985).
Whiteside, 106 S.Ct. at 993.
Id. at 997.
49 See supra note 1.
50 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
51 Id. at 49.
52 Id.

53 Id. The trial judge insisted that if no specific appointment of counsel was
made, it was his understanding that the members of the bar would continue to
represent the defendants. Id.
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ing of the trial.54 Following trial by jury, the defendants were
found guilty by a jury and were sentenced to death.55 Despite
claims that the defendants were denied the right to counsel, the
judgments were affirmed by the state supreme court.5 6
In reviewing the decision, the United States Supreme Court
employed a fourteenth amendment due process analysis 57 to determine whether the defendants were denied the right to counsel. 5' The Powell Court ruled that the defendants were denied
the right to counsel and asserted that those charged with a serious crime must be afforded an adequate opportunity to consult
with counsel and to prepare a defense. 59 The Court concluded
that the designation of counsel was either so uncertain or so
close to the time of trial as to constitute a denial of effective appointment of counsel.60 In conclusion, the Powell Court noted
that the right to counsel was of such a "fundamental character"
that it is embraced within the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, even though the right to counsel is specifi54 Id. at 56.
55 Id. at 50.
56 See id. The judgments were also challenged on the ground that the defend-

ants were not given a "fair, impartial and deliberate trial," but the Court chose not
to address these issues. Id. In addition, the Court declined to consider, in adjudicating the defendants guilty, whether blacks were systematically excluded from the
jury. Id.
57 The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that
"[no] State [shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law...
U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
58 See Powell, 287 U.S. at 50.
59 See id. at 58-59. The Court noted that " '[iut is vain to give the accused a day
in court, with no opportunity to prepare for it, or to guarantee him counsel without
giving the latter any opportunity to acquaint himself with the facts or law of the
case.'" Id. at 59 (quoting Commonwealth v. O'Keefe, 298 Pa. 169, 173; 148 A. 73,
74 (1929)).
60 Id. at 53. Although the trial judge appointed the entire local bar for the purposes of arraignment, the Court held that the likelihood of continued representation was a matter of mere speculation and anticipation of the trial court. Id. at 56.
Such actions imposed no absolute obligation on any member of the bar and served
to deny the defendants the opportunity to consult with counsel and consequently
the opportunity to investigate and prepare for trial. See id. at 56-57. Finally, the
Court concluded that counsel's appearance on the day of trial " ' .. was ratherpro
forma than zealous and active .. .' " and therefore the defendants were not afforded
the right of counsel in any meaningful sense. Id. at 58. See BLACKS LAw DIcrIONARY
1091 (5th ed. 1979) (defining pro forma as "a matter of form or for the sake of
form.") Cf. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984) (twenty five days to prepare defense not a breakdown in adversarial process as to render assistance ineffective); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444 (1940)(counsel afforded three days to
prepare defense held not to deny the defendant's right to effective assistance of
counsel).
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cally addressed in the sixth amendment. 6 '
Six years later, the significance of Powell became apparent
when the United States Supreme Court decided Johnson v.
Zerbst.6 2 In Johnson, the defendant was arrested and charged with
63
feloniously possessing and distributing counterfeit money.
Thereafter, he requested the appointment of counsel for trial but
his claim was denied. 64 Without the assistance of counsel, the
defendant was tried, convicted, and sentenced.65 In reviewing
the defendant's conviction, the Johnson Court began its analysis
by recognizing the sixth amendment right to counsel as necessary
to guarantee the "fundamental human rights of life and liberty"
of those subjected to criminal proceedings. 66 Moreover, since
this right to counsel is constitutionally mandated, its denial
amounts to a jurisdictional bar to an otherwise valid conviction
and sentence.6 7 Finally, the Court noted that while the accused
may waive his right to counsel, such waiver must be both competently and intelligently asserted. 6 ' The Johnson decision, therefore, created an absolute right to counsel in all federal criminal
proceedings.69
Powell, 287 U.S. at 67-68. The Supreme Court held that
'... it is possible that some of the personal rights safeguarded by the
first eight Amendments against National action may also be safeguarded
against state action, because a denial of them would be a denial of due
process of law. If this is so, it is not because those rights are enumerated in the first eight Amendments, but because they are of such a nature that they are included in the conception of due process of law.'
Id. (quoting Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 99 (1908)).
62 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
63 Id. at 459-60.
64 See id at 460. Although a request for counsel was not directed to the trial
judge, a review of the evidence developed at the habeas corpus hearing revealed
that such a request was presented to the district attorney. Id. In support of the
denial, the district attorney replied that the court in South Carolina only appointed
counsel to those charged with a capital crime thereby making the defendant ineligible. Id. The district attorney, however, denied that such a request was ever made
or that he indicated to the defendant that the latter had no such right. Id. at 46061.
65 Id. at 460. The defendant was sentenced to four and one-half years in the
Federal Penitentiary in Atlanta. Id.
66 Id. at 462. See also supra note 2 and accompanying text (Powell Court emphasizing importance of counsel throughout every step of criminal proceedings).
67 Johnson, 304 U.S. at 468.
68 Id. at 468-69.
69 See id at 462-63. This rule is currently codified in FED. R. CRIM. P. 44 which
provides that "[i]f the defendant appears in court without counsel, the court shall
advise him of his right to counsel and assign counsel to represent him at every stage
of the proceeding unless he elects to proceed without counsel or is able to obtain
counsel.
61
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Since the decision in Johnson, the issue of whether the constitutional right to counsel in federal criminal proceedings extends
to state criminal proceedings has been a source of much controversy and litigation.70 It was not until the Court's ruling in Gideon
v. Wainwright,71 that this issue was resolved, and the right of
counsel made applicable to the states.72 In Gideon, the defendant,
Clarence Earl Gideon, was charged with breaking and entering a
poolroom with the intent to perpetrate a misdemeanor.73 Due to
his inability to afford an attorney, he appeared in court and requested that counsel be appointed. 4 The trial judge, however,
denied this request. 75 Thereafter, Gideon represented himself at
a trial by jury and was found guilty. 76 In reversing his conviction,

the Gideon Court recognized that the sixth amendment guarantee
of counsel is " 'fundamental and essential to a fair trial.' ",77 The
Court concluded that because the right to counsel in felony cases
is sufficiently "fundamental" to ensure a fair trial, the sixth
amendment's guarantee "is made
obligatory upon the States by
78
the Fourteenth Amendment.

While Powell,Johnson, and Gideon 79 adequately established the
right to counsel as guaranteed by the sixth amendment, these decisions failed to address and to define the standards for such
assistance. 80

In Glasser v. United States, 8 ' the United States

Supreme Court recognized that the sixth amendment right to
counsel guarantees the right to "effective assistance of
70

See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 337-38 & n.2 (1963).

71 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
72 See id. at 339-40. In so doing, the Court overruled Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S.
455 (1942), which held that the sixth amendment guarantee of counsel is not of
such fundamental nature as to be made applicable to the states by virtue of the
fourteenth amendment.
73 Gideon, 372 U.S. at 336.
74 Id. at 337.
75 Id. In denying Gideon's request for counsel, the court asserted that under
existing Florida law the appointment of counsel was only authorized in capital
cases. Id.
76 Id. Upon being found guilty, the defendant was sentenced to a five-year term
in a state penitentiary. Id.
77 Id. at 342.
78 Id. In a subsequent decision, the Supreme Court extended the sixth amendment right to counsel to include misdemeanor as well as felony cases. Argersinger
v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972).
79 See supra notes 50-78 and accompanying text (discussion of Powell,Johnson, and
Gideon).
80 See generally id.
81 315 U.S. 60 (1942).

1987]

NOTES

951

82

counsel."
In Glasser, the defendants, Glasser and Kretske, were charged
with conspiring to defraud the United States.8 3 The trial court
appointed a single attorney to represent both defendants,8 4 despite being informed that conflicting interests might arise which
would serve to diminish counsel's assistance. 8 5 After a verdict of
guilty was returned, defendant Glasser claimed that joint representation was contrary to the sixth amendment since it served to
deny him the assistance of counsel. 86 In reviewing Glasser's contention, the Court reasoned that simultaneous representation of
both defendants prevented counsel's assistance from being as effective as it otherwise might have been. 87 As a result, the Court
concluded that Glasser had been denied "effective assistance of

counsel" and reversed the verdict. 88 The Glasser Court further
held that in the circumstances before the Court, the need to de-

termine the precise degree of prejudice resulting from this appointment was unnecessary. 89

Although the Court in Glasser pronounced the right to effective assistance of counsel, it was not until the decision in McMann
v. Richardson9 0 that the Supreme Court sought to define precisely
what constitutes such assistance. 9 1 In McMann, the defendants

were charged with various felonies and entered pleas of guilty
82 Id. at 76; see also McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) (sixth
amendment right to counsel guarantees right to effective assistance of counsel).
83 Glasser, 315 U.S. at 63.
84 See id. at 68-69. Initially, the co-defendants, Glasser and Kretske, were represented by separate counsel of Messrs. Stewart and McDonnell, respectively. Id. at
68. Kretske, however, expressed disapproval with his attorney and McDonnell was
therefore dismissed from representation. See id.
85
86

Id. at 76.

88

Id.

See id. at 67. In recounting Glasser's contentions, Justice Murphy noted that
according to the litigant "the court's appointment of Stewart as counsel for Kretske
embarrased and inhibited Stewart's conduct of his defense, in that it prevented
Stewart from adequately safeguarding [his] right to have incompetent evidence excluded and from fully cross-examining the witnesses for the prosecution." Id. at
72.
87 Id. at 76.
Id. The Court held that "[t]he right to have the assistance of counsel is too
fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the
amount of prejudice arising from its denial. Id.
90 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
91 See id. Prior to this, the standard for evaluating claims of ineffective assistance
was the "farce and mockery" test. See Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667 (D.C.Cir.), cert.
denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945). This test required that counsel's errors "[shock) the
conscience of the court" and reduce the proceedings to a "mockery of justice"
before being rendered ineffective. Id. at 670.
89
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upon the advice of counsel.92 The defendants then petitioned for
collateral relief, alleging that their pleas were the illegal product
of prior coerced confessions.93 Moreover, they claimed that
counsel's mistaken assessment as to the admissibility of the confessions resulted in erroneous advice which led to their pleas of
guilty. 9 4 Based upon the foregoing, the defendants asserted that

their pleas were ill advised and, therefore, they were voidable
acts .0

In reviewing counsel's advice to plead guilty, the McMann
Court recognized that the determination of whether an attorney
was incompetent is not contingent upon whether a court would,
in hindsight, view the advice to be correct or incorrect.96 Rather,
the Court concluded that the inquiry is "whether that advice was
within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." 7 Beyond this, however, the McMann Court did little
in the way of delineating what conduct of counsel falls within the
zone of competence. 98
In 1984, the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington,99
fully addressed, for the first time, the standards that should be
considered in assessing whether counsel's assistance at the trial
or sentencing was ineffective.10 0 In Strickland, David Leroy Washington was indicted by the State of Florida on a series of charges
McMann, 397 U.S. at 761-64.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 769.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 770-71.
97 Id. at 771.
98 See id. Writing for the majority, Justice White noted that:
[b]eyond this we think the matter, for the most part, should be left to
the good sense and discretion of the trial courts with the admonition
that if the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution is to serve its
purpose, defendants cannot be left to the mercies of incompetent counsel, and that judges should strive to maintain proper standards of performance by attorneys who are representing defendants in criminal
cases in their courts.
Id.
99 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
100 Id. at 683. Prior to this, the Court had only addressed sixth amendment
claims arising from the actual or constructive denial of counsel's assistance. See,
e.g.,
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (counsel not present at trial). In
addition, the Court has reviewed claims of ineffective assistance of counsel based
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976) (proseupon state interference. See, e.g.,
cutor failing to supply counsel with defendant's criminal record); Geders v. United
States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976) (defense counsel ordered not to confer with client during an overnight recess).
92
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among which were three counts of first degree murder.' 0 '
Against the advice of his attorney, William Tunkey, Washington
pled guilty to all charges and waived his right to a jury at the
sentencing hearing. 0 2 In his defense, Washington asserted that
he had no substantial prior criminal record and, at the time of the
incident, was under great stress due
to his inability to meet the
03
family.'
his
of
obligations
financial
At the sentencing hearing, Tunkey did not present any evi0 4
dence concerning Washington's character and emotional state.
Instead, he merely emphasized the defendant's admission of guilt
and the fact that he had no history of criminal activity.' 0 5 At the
close of the hearing the judge, in finding numerous aggravating
circumstances, sentenced Washington to death on each of the
three counts of murder and to prison terms for the other
the judgecrimes.' 06 The Supreme Court of Florida 0affirmed
7
ments of the convictions and the sentences.'
Thereafter, Washington moved for post-conviction relief in
a Florida circuit court. 0 8 Among the many challenges to his sen101 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 672. The defendant was also charged with assault, attempted murder, breaking and entering, conspiracy to commit robbery, kidnapping
for ransom, and robbery. Id.
102 Id. Immediately following his indictment, Washington was appointed the
counsel of William Tunkey, an experienced criminal lawyer who was regarded as
" 'one of the leading criminal defense attorney's in Dade County ... ' " Washington
v. Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243,1247 n.2. (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc), rev'd, 466 U.S. 668
(1984).
103 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 672.
104 Id. at 672-73. This decision was reflective of Tunkey's sense of hopelessness
in overcoming the effect of Washington's confession and guilty plea. Id. at 673.
Moreover, Tunkey testified that he did not feel " 'that there was anything which
[he] could do which was going to save David Washington from his fate.' " Washington v. Strickland, 673 F.2d 879, 886 (5th Cir.), vacated, 693 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir.
1982) (en banc), rev'd, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
105 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 887. Tunkey later acknowledged that his decision to
rely on Washington's confession and guilty plea was based on his familiarity of the
sentencing judge, whom he described as a person who " 'respected any individual
who had been accused of a crime and who, in fact, was guilty of a crime who came
before him and admitted his guilt.'" Id.
106 Washington v. State, 362 So.2d 658, 662-63 (Fla. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S.
937 (1979), remand, 397 So.2d 285 (Fla. 1981), remandhabeas petition granted sub nom.
Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc), rev'd, 466 U.S.
668 (1984). In addition to the imposition of the death penalty, Washington received sentences of life imprisonment in connection with the counts of robbery,
kidnapping, breaking and entering, and unlawful assault; thirty years imprisonment
with respect to each of the three counts of first degree attempted murder; and fifteen years imprisonment for conspiring to perpetrate robbery. Id. at 662. These
sentences were to run consecutively. Id.
107 Id. at 667.
108 Washington v. State, 397 So.2d 285,286 (Fla.1981), remand habeas petition
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tence, Washington's primary contention was that he was denied
effective assistance of trial counsel as a result of his attorney's
failure to present certain evidence in the sentencing phase of his
prosecution.' 0 9 Without holding an evidentiary hearing, the
court denied the defendant's motion and, on appeal, the Florida

Supreme Court affirmed.110
Having exhausted his state remedies, Washington then filed
grantedsub nom. Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc),
rev'd, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Washington brought the motion for post-conviction
relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Id. The rule, in pertinent
part, provides that:
"[a] prisoner in custody ... claiming the right to be released upon
the ground that the judgment was entered or that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution . . . may move the court which
entered the judgment or imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or
correct the judgment or sentence."
FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.850.
'09 Washington, 397 So.2d at 286. In support of his claim that he was denied effective assistance of counsel, Washington asserted that his attorney was: (1) remiss in
procuring a continuance in an effort to prepare a defense for the sentencing phase
of the defendants' prosecution; (2) failed to acquire a psychiatric report; (3) declined to seek out the present character witnesses; (4) neglected to obtain a
presentence investigation report; (5) failed to offer meaningful arguments to the
sentencing judge; and (6) failed to research medical examiner's reports as well as to
cross-examine those persons. Id.
110 Id. In denying the motion, the Florida circuit court reviewed Washington's
allegations under the standards set forth in Knight v. State, 394 So.2d 997 (Fla.
1981). In setting forth the following four-step analysis for ineffective assistance of
counsel claims, the Florida Supreme Court, in Knight, drew upon Judge Leventhal's
plurality opinion in United States v. DeCoster, 624 F.2d 196 (D.C.Cir.)(en banc),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 944 (1979). Knight, 394 So.2d at 1000-01. Accordingly, the
court held that:
First, the specific omission or overt act upon which the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is based must be detailed in the appropriate pleading.
Second, the defendant has the burden to show that this specific
omission or overt act was a substantial and serious deficiency measurably below that of competent counsel.... We recognize that in applying
this standard, death penalty cases are different, and consequently the
performance of counsel must be judged in light of these circumstances.
Third, the defendant has the burden to show that this specific, serious deficiency, when considered under the circumstances of the individual case, was substantial enough to demonstrate a prejudice to the
defendant to the extent that there is a likelihood that the deficient conduct affected the outcome of the court proceedings. In the case of appellate counsel, this means the deficiency must concern an issue which is
error affecting the outcome, not simply harmless error ....
Fourth, in the event a defendant does show a substantial deficiency
and presents a prima facie showing of prejudice, the state still has an
opportunity to rebut these assertions by showing beyond a reasonable
doubt that there was no prejudice in fact. This opportunity to rebut applies even if a constitutional violation has been established.
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a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida."' Washington reasserted that he was denied effective assistance of counsel based on
the same errors advanced in the lower courts."I2 After holding
an evidentiary hearing, the district court concluded that Washington's sentencing hearing was not prejudiced through his attorney's failure to present mitigating evidence.' 11 On appeal, the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded and ordered that the
case be scrutinized under their newly developed framework for
analyzing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel claims." 4
In reversing the decision of the court of appeals, the United
States Supreme Court initially acknowledged that the proper
standard for attorney performance is that of " 'reasonably effective assistance.' ""s The Strickland Court held that to sustain relief based on ineffective assistance, a defendant must show that
the attorney's conduct "so undermined the proper functioning of
the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.""' 6 In making this determination, the
Court applied a two-part test: first, the defendant must establish
that his attorney's performance was deficient,"17 and second,
counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the defendant by depriving him of a fair trial.' 1 8 Based upon this criteria, the Strickland Court found that counsel's failure to present all mitigating
evidence at the sentencing hearing was inadequate to establish
that the defendant was denied his sixth amendment right to
Knight, 394 So.2d at 1001 (citations omitted).
The Washington court held that under the Knight criteria, Washington had failed
to establish a prima facie showing of a significant deficiency or potential prejudice
so as to entitle him to relief. Washington, 397 So.2d at 287. Accordingly, the court
held that the defendant's motion was without merit so as to preclude the necessity
for an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 286.
III See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 678 (1984).
112 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 678; see supra note 109 and accompanying text (contentions advanced in lower courts).
113 Washington, 693 F.2d at 1249.
114 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 679.
115 Id. at 683 (citing Trapnell v. United States, 725 F.2d 149, 151-52 (2d Cir.
1983)).
116 Id. at 686.
117 Id. at 687. The Court noted that to establish counsel's performance as deficient, the defendant must show that counsel's errors were so egregious that counsel
was not acting as the "counsel" mandated by the sixth amendment. Id.
118 Id. The Court noted that both showings must be made before it can be said
that the conviction or sentence was due to a deterioration in the adversarial process. Id.
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counsel.119

As supported by the aforementioned line of decisions, it is
evident that the standard for determining a right to counsel claim
is that of reasonable effective assistance. It was not until Nix v.
Whiteside, 12° however, that the Supreme Court determined
whether an attorney's refusal to cooperate with his client in
presenting perjured testimony at trial is violative of21the client's
1
sixth amendment right to the assistance of counsel.
Writing for the majority, 122 Chief Justice Burger initially addressed the two-pronged standard espoused in Strickland. 123
Although the Court did not define the precise conduct that an
attorney should take when faced with the problem of client perjury, it pointed out that under Strickland, the sixth amendment
inquiry is whether such conduct was " 'reasonably effective.' "9124
The majority observed that under this standard, not every ethical
breach established a denial of assistance of counsel. 125 Moreover, the Court emphasized that courts should be careful in restricting standards of professional conduct since this is an area
generally reserved for state authority. ' 26 Guided by these parameters, the Whiteside Court concluded that Robinson's actions in
preventing client perjury fell within the wide range of "reasonable professional
conduct" acceptable under the sixth
27
amendment.

In reaching its decision, the Court reasoned that although an
attorney owes a duty of loyalty and an obligation to defend his
Id. at 699-700.
106 S. Ct. 988 (1986).
See id. at 991.
Chief Justice Burger was joined by Justices White, Powell, Rehnquist, and
O'Connor. Id. at 989. Justice Brennan filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Id. Justice Blackmun filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in which
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens joined. Id. Justice Stevens filed an opinion
concurring in the judgment. Id.
123 See supra notes 117-118 and accompanying text (discussion of Strickland's twopart standard).
124 Id. at 994. The Court noted that under the "reasonably effective" standard, a
reviewing court must " 'indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance,'" to offset the inclination to criticize an unsuccessful defense. Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 See id. at 997. The Court concluded that Robinson's conduct was within the
range of reasonable professional conduct acceptable under Strickland; namely,
"[w]hether... seen as a successful attempt to dissuade [Whiteside] from committing the crime of perjury, or whether seen as a 'threat' to withdraw from representation and disclose the illegal scheme .... Id.
"19
120
121
122
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client's cause, such efforts are constrained by legitimate and lawful conduct that is in accord with the purpose of a trial as a factfinding forum. 128 Chief Justice Burger held that despite these
overlapping duties, an attorney is precluded from assisting his
client in adducing false evidence or otherwise contravening the
law. 129 Moreover, the Court observed that notwithstanding the
attorney-client privilege of nondisclosure of confidential information, accepted norms require an attorney to reveal perjury that
30
the client has committed or plans to commit.

In reviewing the Court of Appeals holding that Robinson's
"'action deprived [Whiteside] of due process and effective assistance of counsel,' " ChiefJustice Burger found that such a conclusion was unsupported by the record.' 3 ' The Court recognized
that Robinson's conduct served only to deprive Whiteside of his
intent to commit perjury and did not refute Whiteside's claim
that he acted on the belief that the victim was attempting to reach
Id. at 994.
Id. In reaching this conclusion, ChiefJustice Burger relied on the Canons of
Professional Ethics, Canon 32, adopted in 1908, that provides:
"No client, corporate or individual, however powerful, nor any cause,
civil or political, however important, is entitled to receive nor should
any lawyer render any service or advice involving disloyalty to the law
whose ministers we are, or disrespect of the judicial office, which we are
bound to uphold, or corruption of any person or persons exercising a
public office or private trust, or deception or betrayal of the public....
He must. . . .observe and advise his client to observe the statute
law .... "
Whiteside, 106 S. Ct. at 994 (quoting CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, Canon 32
(1908)); see also CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, Canon 37, (1928) (providing that
"[t]he announced intention of a client to commit a crime is not included within the
confidences which [the attorney] is bound to respect.").
The Whiteside Court further noted that these standards have endured and exist
in contemporary codifications of the rules of professional responsibility. Relying on
Disciplinary Rule 7-102 of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility (1980),
Chief Justice Burger noted that:
"(A) In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not:
128
129

(4)

Knowingly use perjured testimony or false evidence.

(7) Counsel or assist his client in conduct that the lawyer knows to
be illegal or fraudulent."
Whiteside, 106 S. Ct. at 995 (quoting MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
DR 7-102 (1980)).
130 Id. The Court noted that this exception to the attorney-client privilege is derived from the recognition that perjury is a statutory felony in most states. Id. at
996. Moreover, the Court observed that both the Model Code of Professional Conduct and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct require disclosure of client perjury. Id. at 995.
131 Id. at 997.
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for a gun. 13 2 Similarly, the Chief Justice noted that the record
was devoid of any indication that Robinson's efforts, in preventing the perjured testimony, undermined Whiteside's right to testify on his own behalf.' 33 The Court therefore concluded that
Robinson's performance was effective since he successfully dis134
suaded Whiteside from perpetrating the crime of perjury.
Addressing the second prong of the Strickland inquiry, Chief
Justice Burger concluded that counsel's actions fell short of establishing the prejudice required to sustain habeas corpus relief.' 35 In support of this conclusion, the majority pointed out
that Whiteside had failed to demonstrate " 'that there [was] a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.' "136
In particular, the Court found that his desisting from the contemplated perjury did not diminish the eventual findings of the trial
court.'

37

In an effort to circumvent the prejudice requirement,

however, Whiteside also asserted that his attorney was representing conflicting interests.'3 8 Although Whiteside's proposed perjury and Robinson's ethical obligation as an officer of the court
admittedly represented a "conflict," Chief Justice Burger concluded that it was not of the kind necessary to invalidate an
3 9
otherwise sound representation.1

In a concurring opinion, Justice Brennan reemphasized the
majority's holding that a state's authority to set standards of professional conduct for those who practice in its courts should not
Id.
Id. In support of this, the Court noted that a review of the record revealed
that Whiteside did in fact testify and was merely prohibited from testifying falsely.
Id. Moreover, while testifying, he was aided by Robinson's efforts in establishing a
self-defense claim based upon Whiteside's fear that the victim was reaching for a
weapon. Id.
134 Id.
135 See id. at 999.
136 Id. (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)). In Strickland, the Court noted that "[a] reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome [of the trial]." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
137 Whiteside, 106 S.Ct. at 999. ChiefJustice Burger noted that "[elven if we were
to assume that the jury might have believed his perjury, it does not follow that
Whiteside was prejudiced." Id.
138 Id.; see Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980) (showing of prejudicial default
on part of counsel unnecessary where attorney actively represents conflicting
interests).
139 Whiteside, 106 S.Ct. at 999. The Court noted that if such a "conflict" were
deemed prejudicial, "every guilty criminal's conviction would be suspect if the defendant had sought to obtain an acquittal by illegal means." Id.
132
133
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be impeded.140 The Justice noted that such a conclusion necessarily follows due to the absence of any constitutional authority
to promulgate rules of professional conduct.' 4 1 Justice Brennan,
however, expressed displeasure with the majority's failure to observe this limitation and, as a result, the majority's sharing with
the legal community its discourse on ethical conduct with regard
to client perjury. 14 2 In conclusion, the Justice posited that the
Court's efforts to this affect were without force of law and therefore were not controlling in determining the appropriate
re143
sponse to a client's insistence on committing perjury.
Justice Blackmun also filed an opinion wherein he concurred
with the Court's judgment. 144 He agreed with Chief Justice Burger that Whiteside was not injured by his attorney's actions to the
level warranting federal habeas relief.145 Justice Blackmun, however, believed that the majority erroneously employed the Strickland standard by basing its initial inquiry as to whether
Robinson's performance was within the scope of reasonable professional assistance.' 4 6 Justice Blackmun asserted that the issue
of ineffective assistance of counsel should have been disposed of
through the less onerous showing that Whiteside had failed 1to
47
establish that he was prejudiced by his attorney's actions.
Moreover, the Justice pointed out the advantage of this approach
as it precludes the need to determine the difficult question of
whether counsel's performance was deficient. 4 "
In assessing Whiteside's claim of prejudice, Justice Blackmun noted that such a determination should rest on whether he
was, in some way, deprived of a fair trial. 149 In the instant action,
Robinson's threat merely served to prevent Whiteside from testiSee id. at 1000 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Id. Justice Brennan also cited the lack of any statute which would afford the
Federal courts jurisdiction over legal ethics. Id.
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 See id. at 1000 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
145 Id.
146 See id. at 1003 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
147 See id. at 1003-04 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
148 Id. at 1003 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun pointed out that:
a court need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies. . . . If it is easier to dispose of an
ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which
we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.
Id. (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697 (1984)).
149 Id. at 1004 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
140
141
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fying falsely at his trial. 150 Thus, the Justice believed that the critical issue was whether the trial's outcome was adversely affected
by the fact that Whiteside refrained from proffering such testimony. 15 ' Recognizing that perjured testimony is in direct opposition to our system of justice, 5 2 Justice Blackmun concluded
that counsel's actions in preventing such evidence neither affected the judgment of the jurors nor undermined the outcome
of Whiteside's trial. 15
Justice Stevens, in the Court's final concurrence, noted that
Whiteside clearly displayed an intent to commit perjury and that
this fact was known by his attorney. 54 Recognizing that perjured
testimony may potentially destroy an otherwise meritorious case,
the Justice asserted that a duty is owed by the lawyer to prevent
the admission of such testimony. 15 Based upon the foregoing,
Justice Stevens examined Robinson's representation and found
that not only were his efforts to this affect successful, but that in
so doing his client suffered no " 'legally cognizable prejudice.' ",156 Although declining to address what an attorney
"must, should, or may" do when faced with client perjury, the
Justice concluded that, in this isolated instance, Robinson's actions were proper and provided his client with effective
57
representation.1

In light of the existing law, the Supreme Court's resolution
of the question presented in Whiteside was undoubtedly the correct one. As noted by the majority, aside from the absence of any
constitutional right to commit perjury, 158 the admonitions of
Whiteside's attorney in no way impaired the reliability of the factfinding process. 159 Moreover, Robinson did not divulge any cliId.
15' Id.
152 Id. Justice Blackmun noted that " '[aill perjured ... testimony is at war with
justice, since it may produce a judgment not resting on truth.' " Id. (quoting In re
Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 227 (1945)). See also United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620,
626-27 (1980) (indicating defendant's obligation to testify truthfully).
153 See Whiteside, 106 S.Ct. at 1004 (Blackmun, J., concurring); see also United
States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (if conviction is obtained by knowing use
of perjured testimony, judgment must be set aside when there is any reasonable
likelihood that testimony affected judgment of jury).
154 Whiteside, 106 S.Ct. at 1007 (Stevens, J., concurring).
155 Id. Justice Stevens additionally recognized that this duty imposed upon the
attorney was owed to the court as well as the client. Id.
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Id. at 993. See also supra note 5 (the right of an accused to testify does not
include the right to commit perjury).
159 Whiteside, 106 S.Ct. at 993.
150
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ent communication until it became absolutely necessary in response to Whiteside's challenge as to his representation. 60
Thus, the only impact of the admonitions was to prevent the proposed perjurious testimony at trial which should not be viewed
as
16 1
impermissibly compromising Whiteside's right to testify.
In rendering this decision, the Court recognized that the intent to commit perjury- is indistinguishable from the situation
where a defendant threatens or tampers with a witness or a member of the jury. 1 62 In such instances, an attorney would not
163
merely be limited to advising his client against such conduct.
Similarly, the duty of confidentiality which covers the attorneyclient relationship does not extend to the announced plans of engaging in the future criminal act of perjury." 6 Against this backdrop, the Whiteside Court utilized the two-pronged Strickland
inquiry in concluding that Robinson's actions were entirely appropriate and
within the wide range of professionally competent
65
assistance. 1

In regard to the performance standard, 166 therefore, the
Strickland majority undoubtedly theorized that the test's flexible
nature would encompass most every criminal case. A review of
the standard, however, serves to undermine that presumption.
By assessing attorney performance against a "standard of reasonableness," the Court has left sixth amendment claims susceptible
16 7
to varied interpretation and application by the lower courts.
The vagueness of this standard was perceived by Justice Marshall's dissent in Strickland in which he noted that "[t]o tell lawyers and the lower courts that counsel for a criminal defendant
must behave 'reasonably' and must act like 'a reasonably competent attorney,'.

. .

is to tell them almost nothing."' 68 Moreover,

by leaving reviewing courts with unfettered discretion in deter160

Id. at 997.

161 See id.

Id. at 998.
Id.
164 Id.; see also Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933) (attorney-client privilege does not extend to commission of fraud).
165 Whiteside, 106 S.Ct. at 997.
166 See supra note 117 and accompanying text (discussing the performance standard of the two-pronged Strickland inquiry).
167 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 707-08 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall noted that the performance standard "is so malleable
that, in practice, it will either have no grip at all or will yield excessive variation in
the manner in which the Sixth Amendment is interpreted and applied by different
courts." Id. at 707 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
168 Id. at 707-08 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
162
163
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mining what constitutes "professional" representation, the development of more detailed standards in evaluating counsel
performance is problematic.' 6 9 Therefore, the seemingly "objective" nature of the "reasonably effective" test for counsel performance is, in actuality, too subjective to sustain uniform
application.
Moreover, the requirement that the defendant establish prejudice 170 on account of his attorney's assistance is equally objectionable. For instance, it is often difficult to determine whether
someone claiming ineffective assistance would have fared better
had the attorney been more competent by a mere review of the
appellate record.' 7 ' These difficulties are further enhanced by
the possibility that such evidence, which otherwise would have
been contained in the record, is missing as a direct result of
counsel's incompetence. 1 72 Based upon these impediments, it is
unduly burdensome to require a defendant to establish prejudice
17
where counsel has been shown to be incompetent.
A major shortcoming of the Whiteside decision, therefore, was
its strict adherence to the two-pronged standard set forth in
Strickland. Presented with an opportunity to articulate uniform
standards in resolving claims of ineffectiveness of counsel, 1 74 the
majority chose to limit its holding to the facts of the case.
Although removing from the ethical obligations of an attorney
the continued representation of a perjury-determined client, the
ruling in Whiteside did little in the way of adjudicating sixth
amendment claims. Clearly, in the future, the Court must develop particularized standards that will ensure that all defendant's receive effective legal assistance.
James F. Mullen
Id. at 708 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
See supra note 118 and accompanying text (discussing the prejudice standard
of the two-pronged Strickland inquiry).
171 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 710 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In Strickland, Justice
Marshall recognized that, "it may be impossible for a reviewing court confidently to
ascertain how the government's evidence and arguments would have stood up
against rebuttal and cross-examination by a shrewd, well prepared lawyer." Id.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 See generally Erickson, Standards of Competency for Defense Counsel in a Criminal
Case, 17 AM. CRIM. L.REv. 233, 242-48 (1979) (reviewing decisions attempting to
develop guidelines in assessing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel); Note,
Identifying and Remedying Ineffective Assistance of Criminal Defense Counsel: A New Look
After United States v. Decoster, 93 HARV. L. REV. 752, 756-58 (1980).
169
170

